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The Tools at Hand: Medicaid Payment Reform for
People with Complex Medical Needs
John V Jacobi*
I. INTRODUCTION

Medicaid reform occurs in a sprawling landscape, encompassing efforts
to expand the number of states taking advantage ofthe Affordable Care Act's
(ACA) opportunity for state eligibility expansion, to place increasingly
onerous conditions (including work requirements and ramped-up
documentation requirements) on Medicaid participation, and to create
beneficiary-controlled health savings accounts.1 Analysis of these and other
efforts is vital to charting the future of Medicaid. This article limits itself to
one small, but important, corner of the reform landscape: the use of
alternative payment models (APMs) to improve care for Medicaid
beneficiaries with complex medical needs. The health status of Medicaid's
most vulnerable beneficiaries tends to be quite poor. Improvements to
Medicaid will require extending beneficiaries' access to innovative models
of coordinated care, which emphasize addressing social determinants of
health. Promising care models are emerging, and states are beginning to use
the power of Medicaid to increase care value and enhance efficiency in the
care of a small, vulnerable, and expensive subset of beneficiaries.0
This article argues that expanding the substantive range of Medicaid
services to include social services, as well as more traditional health services,
for a subset of high-needs Medicaid beneficiaries is both wise and lawful.
*

Dorothea Dix Professor of Health Law and Policy, Seton Hall Law School.

1.
Rachel Garfield et al., Implications of Work Requirements in Medicaid. What Does the
DataSay?, HENRY JKAISER FAM. FouND. (June 12, 2018),

http://files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-Brief-Implications-of-Work-Requirements-in-MedicaidWhat-Does-the-Data-Say; Rachel Garfield et al., The Coverage Gap: UninsuredPoor
Adults in States that Do Not ExpandMedicaid, HENRY J KAISER FAM. FouND. (Mar. 21,

2019), http://files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-Brief-The-Coverage-Gap-Uninsured-PoorAdults-in-States-that-Do-Not-Expand-Medicaid; Randy Pate, Person-CenteredStrategies:
Health Savings Accounts, CMS.GOV (Aug. 23, 2018), https://www.cms.gov/blog/personcentered-strategies-health-savings-accounts.
2.
Julia C. Martinez et al., Improving the Health Care System: Seven State Strategies,
NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES 1, 1 (July 2016),
http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/Health/ImprovingHealthSystemsBriefl6.pdf.
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Part I describes the characteristics of the target population of medically
complex patients. It also describes the health care and finance innovations
that seek to reverse the historic and harmful fragmentation of services by
targeting them for improved health status through integration of medical and
social services. Lastly, Part I describes two health systems and finance
responses to the target population's needs, one medical and one social. Part
II discusses a larger integration effort in Medicaid by which "health" services
are broadly construed, with delivery and finance innovations addressing
social determinants of health through whole-person services.
Part III then describes the legal authority that states can draw upon to use
these innovative integrated care models in their Medicaid programs. States
have authority directly under the Medicaid statute, as amended by the ACA. 3
Specifically, states have broad experimental powers under Section 1115
waivers, which, with the approval of the Secretary of the Department of
Health and Human Services, allows them to implement delivery and finance
systems capable of bridging the gap between medical and social services for
beneficiaries with complex needs. 4 Furthermore, states have newly-codified
power to require managed care organizations that contract with state
Medicaid agencies to engage in broadly integrative methods, including
partnering with community organizations, to achieve positive results for
vulnerable populations.5 Finally, Part IV discusses some of the potential
pitfalls of embracing private agencies' aggregation of the means to affect the
social and medical well-being of vulnerable populations and communities.
While adopting methods of broad integrative care promises tremendous
benefits for individuals and vulnerable populations, it is important to
consider the pitfalls that may stand in the way of success.
II. COMPLEX PATIENTS, THE MEDICAL RESPONSE, AND MEDICAID CARE
MANAGEMENT

The distribution of care needs among patients is heterogeneous. 0
3.

One

Section 1115 Demonstrations,MEDICAID.GOV,

https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/section-1 115-demo/index. html (last visited Apr. 1,
2019).
4.
Elizabeth Hinton et al., Section 1115 Medicaid Demonstration Waivers: The Current
Landscape ofApproved and Pending Waivers, HENRY J KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Feb. 12,

2019), http://files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-Brief-Section-I 15-Medicaid-DemonstrationWaivers-The-Current-Landscape-of-Approved-and-Pending-Waivers.
5. Kathleen Gifford et al., States Focus on Quality and Outcomes Amid Waiver Changes:
Resultsfrom a 50-State Medicaid Budget Survey for State Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019,
HENRY J KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.kff.org/report-section/states-

focus-on-quality-and-outcomes-amid-waiver-changes-managed-care-initiatives/.
6.
Robin Rudowitz et al., 10 Things to Know aboutMedicaid: Setting the Facts Straight,
KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION (Mar. 6, 2019), http://files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-Brief-10-

Things-to-Know-about-Medicaid-Setting-the-Facts-Straight.
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percent of Americans account for over twenty percent of health care costs
per year, with five percent accounting for over half of the annual health
expenditures. 7 Many people use little to no healthcare resources in a year,
while others are heavy users.' Although many people move in and out of the
highest-spender categories from year to year, others consistently fall within
the most complex and expensive patients.9 Researchers have identified the
following as indicators for high-needs patients: high medical costs, use of
intensive medical interventions, and limitations on functional abilities.' 0 The
skewed nature of health care needs significantly impacts health care delivery
and finance.
Health systems researchers who examine means to improve quality and
increase efficiency in health care delivery and finance have focused on highutilizing patients for two reasons." First, high-utilizing patients are, by
definition, key drivers of health care costs.1 2 Attention to relatively discrete
groups that are responsible for out-sized proportions of national and
programmatic health expenditures is a sensible strategy for those seeking
insight into the causes of increasing health costs. Second, high-utilizers'
health conditions often require innovative care, close coordination of care,
and, therefore, coordinated care plans. 13 Fragmentation of health care
delivery and finance is considered partially responsible for the high costs of
care of medically complex patients. Thus, reducing that fragmentation has
been a robust area of research and innovation.' 4

7.
Emily M. Mitchell & Steven R. Machlin, Concentration ofHealth Expenditures and
Selected CharacteristicsofHigh Spenders, U.S. Civilian NoninstitutionalizedPopulation,

& QUALITY (Dec. 2017),
https://meps.ahrq.gov/datafiles/publications/st506/stat506.pdf

2015, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES.

8. See Peter Long et al., Effective Carefor High-Need Patients: Opportunitiesfor
Improving Outcomes, Value, and Health, NAT'L ACAD. MEDICINE 1, 1 (2017),

https://nam.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Effective-Care-for-High-Need-Patients.pdf
(discussing multiple studies reporting that approximately 50 percent of Americans account
for approximately three percent of health care utilization while one percent of Americans
account for about 20 percent, and five percent account for about 50 percent of utilization).
9. William C. Johnson et al., Consistently High Turnover in the Group of Top Health Care
Spenders, NEJM CATALYST (Feb. 1, 2018), https://catalyst.nejm.org/high-turnover-tophealth-care-spenders/; Mark W. Stanton, The High Concentrationof U.S. Health Care
Expenditures, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY 1, 2 (June 2006),

https://meps.ahrq.gov/datafiles/publications/ral 9/ral 9.pdf.
10. Long, supra note 8, at 5.
11. Long, supra note 8, at 5.
12. David Blumenthal & Melinda Abrams, TailoringCareManagementfor High-Need,
High-CostPatients, 316 J. AM. MEDICAL Ass'N 1657, 1657 (2016).
13. Id. at 1657-58; Long et al., supra note 8.
14. See generallyDonald M. Berwick et al., The Triple Aim: Care, Health, And Cost, 27
HEALTH AFF. 759.759-69; EINER ELHAUGE, THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTHCARE:

CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS 1-2 (Einer Elhauge ed., 2010); see generally Alain C. Enthoven,
IntegratedDelivery Systems: The Cure for Fragmentation, 15 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 284,
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Recognition of the skewed distribution of costs and needs impels a reform
focus on high-cost and medically complex patients. The cost of health care
is consequential to everyone responsible for paying for services, including
Federal and State Governments, plan sponsors, and individual consumers.15
Effective cost containment reflects awareness of skewed distribution of costs
toward the needs of complex patients. Likewise, efforts to improve the
quality of care require payors and plan administrators to focus energies on
those patients for whom care coordination has the greatest health payoff
The skewed distribution of costs has been a catalyst for innovative
alternative payment models.1 6 These models, which share the feature of
moving away from disjointed fee-for-service payment and toward
coordinated care models in which payment is tied to outcomes and quality,
are becoming more prevalent in private and public insurance programs. 17
Health delivery and finance responses to high-cost patients can generally be
divided into two categories. First are those responses premised on improving
coordination among medical care providers through care management
techniques. The second category goes beyond management of medical care
and includes non-medical services, shifting the focus from the remediation
of illness and injury to interventions directly addressing needs that arise from
the effects of social determinants of health.
The medical system's primary response to high-cost patients focuses on
care coordination - a means of organizing care to ameliorate the effects of

284-290 (2009); INST. OF MED., To ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 3

(Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000).
15. See Ezekiel Emanuel, The Real Cost of the US Health Care System, 319 J. AM.
MEDICAL Ass'N 983, 984 (2018) (explaining that increasing health costs has a tendency to

crowd out other socially desirable expenditures).
16. J. Michael McWilliams et al., Early Performance ofAccountable Care Organizations
in Medicare, 374 NEWENG. J. MED. 2357 (2016); Sylvia Burwell, Setting Value-Based
Payment Goals - HHS Efforts to Improve U.S. Health Care, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 897
(2015); Zini Song et al., Changes in Health Care Spending and Quality 4 Years into Global
Payment, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED 1704 (2014).
17. See, e.g., Mark McClellan et al., PaymentReform for Better Value andMedical
Innovation, NAT'L ACAD. MED. (Mar. 17, 2017), https://nam.edu/wpcontent/uploads/20 17/03/Payment-Reform-for-Better-Value-and-Medical-Innovation.pdf
(describing private insurers' innovative payment methods directed to improved care
coordination); Michael E. Porter & Robert S. Kaplan, How to Payfor Health Care, HARv.
BUS. REV. (2016), https://hbr.org/20 16/07/how-to-pay-for-health-care (discussing private
payors and insurers moving to alternative payment models); see Randall S. Brown et al., Six
FeaturesOfMedicare CoordinatedCareDemonstrationPrograms That Cut Hospital
Admissions OfHigh-Risk Patients, 31 HEALTH AFF. 1156 (2012) (discussing Medicare
Coordinated Care Demonstration program); Patrick H. Casey et al., Effect ofHospital-Based
Comprehensive Care Clinic on Health Costsfor Medicaid-InsuredMe dically Complex
Children, 165 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 392 (2011) (discussing
Medicaid's coordinated care program for children with complex needs).
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health care fragmentation.'8 "Fragmentation" in this context connotes the
siloed structure of traditional health care delivery and finance.1 9 This
fragmentation results in uneven or absent consultation among physicians and
other caregivers, leading to inconsistent and contradictory courses of care. 20
This discord affects quality and cost, and is fueled in part by the traditional
form of insurance payment. 2 ' In the traditional form of insurance payment,
fee-for-service payments compensate on the basis of piece-work, not on the
basis of outcomes or coordinated treatment plans. As a result, the fee-forservice model provides little or no incentive for coordination or consultation
on patient care .22 Almost twenty years ago, the Institute of Medicine noted
as a central problem in the American health delivery system the quality and
cost effects of this fragmentation:

*

*

The decentralized and fragmented nature of the health care delivery system
(some would say "nonsystem") . . contributes to unsafe conditions for
patients, and serves as an impediment to efforts to improve safety. * *
The provision of care to patients by a collection of loosely affiliated
organizations and providers makes it difficult to implement improved
clinical information systems capable of providing timely access to
complete patient information. Unsafe care is one of the prices we pay for
not having organized systems of care with clear lines of accountability.
* * The context in which health care is purchased further exacerbates these
problems. * * * Most third party payment systems provide little incentive
for a health care organization to improve safety, nor do they recognize and
reward safety or quality. 23
The problems of fragmentation are exacerbated for complex patients, for
whom coordination is most beneficial.2 4 These patients share several
characteristics. For example, they often require intense medical care,
experience functional limitations that interfere with their self-care or access
to services, and they accrue substantial health care costs. 25 Furthermore,
complex patients often experience multiple chronic illnesses, which further
adds to their need for care coordination.26
Additionally, Medicaid disproportionately covers these complex patients.
18. Dennis Z. Kuo et al., Care Coordination for Children With Medical Complexity:
Care Is It, Anyway?, 141 PEDIATRICS 224, 224-232 (2017).
19.

Whose

Id.

20. Elhauge, supra note 14, at 2.
21. Berwick et al., supra note 14, at 9.
22. Kuo et al., supra note 18, at 229.
23. INST. OF MED., supra note 14, at 3.
24. Long et al., supra note 8, at 42.
25. Long et al., supra note 8, at 104.
26. Ken Thorpe et al., Prevalence And Spending Associated With Patients Who Have A
Behavioral Health Disorder And Other Conditions, 36 HEALTH AFF. 124 (2017).
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Almost half of all children with special healthcare needs and nonelderly
adults with disabilities - including many with behavioral health conditions
that are highly correlated with complex care - obtain insurance through
Medicaid. 27 From the perspective of these complex patients with multiple
chronic illnesses, our fragmented medical care system is inefficient due to
its,

.

[M]yopic focus on isolated symptoms rather than the whole person:
"Patients with chronic conditions suffer from fragmented services
. . when they are treated not as persons but instead are segmented or
compartmentalized into discrete organs or body systems. If health
care professionals treat a malfunctioning system of the body rather
than the person as a whole, (i.e., treat the disease in the patient rather
than treat the patient with the disease), treatment can become a
series of medical interventions that target only the disease and
ignore the ill person." 28

The broadly accepted prescription for the fragmentation of care for
complex and high-cost patients is coordination of care through reforms to
primary care delivery. 29 The movement toward coordination-driven reforms
in primary care originated from two observations: (1) primary care forms the
foundation of a well-functioning health care system, and (2) primary care in
the United States is fragmented in nature. 3 0 Many versions of patientcentered primary care exist, but the various models share certain features. 3 1
First, the models comprise practices that genuinely adopt the "four pillars"
of primary care, which are "first-contact care, coordinated care,

27. See generally Cynthia Boyd et al., Clarifying MultimorbidityPatternsto Improve
Targetingand Delivery of ClinicalServices for Medicaid Populations,CTR. FOR HEALTH
CARE STRATEGIES (Dec. 2010),

https://www.chcs.org/media/clarifyingmultimorbiditypatterns.pdf; see also, Rudowitz et
al., supra note 6; see also, John V. Jacobi, Medicaid, Managed Care, and the Mission for the
Poor, 9 ST. LouIs. U.J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 187, 195-96 (2016) (describing higher rates of

disability and chronic illness in Medicaid population) [hereinafter Mission for the Poor].
28. John V. Jacobi, Multiple MedicaidMissions: Targeting, Universalism, or Both?, 15
YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y, L., & ETHICS 89, 105 (2015) (quoting Robert L. Kane et al., MEETING
THE CHALLENGE OF CHRONIC ILLNESS 50 (2005)) [hereinafter Multiple Medicaid Missions].
29. See Christopher G. Wise et al., Journey Tow ardA Patient-CenteredMedical Home:
Readiness For Change In PrimaryCare Practices, 89 MILBANK Q. 399,400 (2011) ("The

patient-centered medical home ... has become a widely proposed model to address
[fragmentation] in primary care").

30. See Id. at 400 (illustrating the observations that primary care forms the foundation of a
well-functioning health care system and the existing primary care in the United States is
fragmented has been discussed since as early as 2001).
31. Karen Davis et al., A 2020 Vision ofPatient-CenteredPrimary Care, 20 J. GEN.
INTERNAL MED. 953, 953 (2005).

https://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol28/iss2/4
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comprehensive care, and sustained personal relationships." 32 Second, many
models adopt a particular form of patient-centered primary care, the Chronic
Care Model,33 which is a heavily-studied form of primary care practice.34
Third, the practices encourage and rely on "activated patients," that is,
patients who engage in the direction and management of their care. 3 5 Fourth,
the practices have the technical means to coordinate care through electronic
health records and other information technologies. 36
Team-based care is a central component of the professional practice within
these coordinated care settings. 37 The needs of people with chronic illnesses
often entail care within various medical specialties, as well as care from those
trained in nursing, social work, and food sciences. 38 For this reason, the team
in a coordinated, primary care setting must include both a variety of
competencies as well as protocols for coordination among the
professionals. 39 Ongoing research tests the capacity of these team-based
chronic care models to counter historic care fragmentation by improving
quality of care without increasing costs. 40 Analysis of the clinical effects are

32. Paul A. Nutting et al., Transforming PhysicianPracticesTo Patient-CenteredMedical
Homes: Lessons From The National DemonstrationProject, 30 HEALTH AFF. 439, 439
(2011).
33. Id. at 439.
34. See Katie Coleman et al., Evidence On The Chronic CareModel In The New
Millennium, 28 HEALTH AFF. 75, 76 (2009) (illustrating the depth of study on The Chronic

Care Model).
35. Nutting et al., supra note 32.
36. Nutting et al., supra note 32.
37.

Lisa Schottenfeld et al., CREATING PATIENT-CENTERED TEAM-BASED PRIMARY CARE 1, 2

(2016) (explaining that team-based delivery of care is an integral part of moving to patientcentered primary care).
38. See Kane et al., supra note 28, at 92 ("Patients with chronic illness will be cared for by
a wide range of health care professionals, including general internists, family practitioners,
and other physicians; advanced practice nurses, nurses, and nursing aids; and social workers,
occupational and physical therapists, and other practitioners").
39. See Kane et al., supra note 28, at 91-93 (detailing the numerous variety of health care

professionals that must work together in a coordinated primary care setting and the
coordination necessary for practitioners to competently provide care, communicate
effectively, coordinate patient care, reconfigure the roles and responsibilities of clinicians
who care for patients with chronic conditions, and avoid burnout); see also Edward H.
Wagner, The Role ofPatient Care Teams In ChronicDisease Management, 320 BMJ 569,

570-71 (2000) (illustrating further the diverse team composition for effective chronic disease
management).
40. See Hanneke W. Drewes et al., The Effectiveness of Chronic Care Managementfor
HeartFailure:
Meta-RegressionAnalyses to Explain the Heterogeneityin Outcomes, 47 HEALTH SERVS.

RES. 1926 (2012) (detailing a research study on the effectiveness of team-based chronic
patient-care); see also Wayne Katon et al., Cost-effectiveness of a Multicondition
CollaborativeCareIntervention: A Randomized ControlledTrial, 69 ARCHIVES GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 506 (2012) (demonstrating significant clinical improvements in care with little
or no added cost).
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promising, although preliminary. Cost studies are similarly underway, and
some promising results have been reported. 5
States have supported patient-centered care models with enhanced
Medicaid reimbursements, including: start-up costs, performance bonuses,
enhanced per-member per-month fees to recognize additional costs of care
mana ement, 5 and enhanced federal matching payment granted by the
ACA.
In sum, substantive improvements to primary care coordination
created by patient-centered care and state Medicaid payment enhancements
have shown the way in enhancing care for complex medical conditions.0
However, for present purposes, two observations are necessary.
First, the development of practice models advancing chronic care

41. See Drewes et al., supra note 40 (detailing a meta-analysis of chronic care management
in heart disease cases which showed reductions in average mortality and hospital usage,
however there were uneven results among the programs); see also Michael Stellefson, et al.,
The Chronic Care Model and Diabetes Management in US Primary Care Settings: A
Systematic Review, 10 PREVENTING CHRONIC DISEASE (2013) (reporting positive outcomes in

diabetes management in primary care settings using chronic case management); see also
Carol Davy et al., Effectiveness of Chronic Care Models: Opportunities For Improving
Healthcare Practice And Health Outcomes: A Systematic Review, 15 BMC HEALTH SERVS.
RES. (2015) (reporting positive clinical results in a meta-analysis of studies conducted in
several countries).
42. See Katon et al., supra note 40 (reporting patients with diabetes and/or coronary heart
disease that showed significant clinical improvements with chronic case management with
little or no added cost to care); see also Robert J. Reid et al., The Group Health Medical
Home At Year Two: Cost Savings, Higher Patient Satisfaction, And Less Burnout For
Providers, 29 HEALTH AFF. 835 (2010) (reporting that a patient-centered medical home for
chronically ill patients had an estimated "total savings of $10.30 per patient per month
twenty-one months into the pilot program").
43. Mary Takach, About Half Of The States Are Implementing Patient-Centered Medical
Homes For Their Medicaid Populations, 31 HEALTH AFF. 2432, 2432-38 (2012); see
Frequently Asked Questions: Patient Centered Medical Homes, N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF
HEALTH, https://www.health.ny.gov/technology/innovationplan initiative/pcmh/faqs.htm
(last revised Feb. 2018) (describing add-ons to fees and per-member per-month payments by
New York Medicaid under an incentive program known as the New York Statewide
Medicaid PCMH Incentive Payment Program that provides additional reimbursement to
high-level National Committee for Quality Assurance's Patient Centered Medical Home
recognized practices); see also Robert L. Phillips Jr. et al., Cost, Utilization, and Quality of
Care: An Evaluation ofIllinois' Medicaid Primary Care Case Management Program, 12
ANNALS FAM. MED. 408 (2014) (describing the primary care case management program,

Illinois Health Connect, in which Illinois Medicaid paid per-member per-month fees and
performance bonuses in addition to fee-for-service payments).
44. See infra Part IV; see also Robin Rudowitz, Understanding How States Access the ACA
EnhancedMedicaidMatch Rates, HENRY J KAISER FAM. FOuND. (Sep. 29, 2014)

http://files.kff.org/attachment/understanding-how-states-access-the-aca-enhanced-medicaidmatch-rates-issue-brief (describing the role the ACA plays in Medicaid funding).
45. See Davy et al., supra note 41 (reporting positive clinical results in a meta-analysis of
studies conducted in several countries); see also Takach, supra note 43 (noting that new
payment systems under Medicaid have led to better alignment of payments with
performance metrics that emphasize health outcomes, patient satisfaction, and cost
containment).
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coordination is an evolution of primary care, which can improve the delivery
of medical care to people with complex care needs and chronic conditions.H
These developments are welcome responses to the observations that
fragmentation of the health care delivery system harms patients, particularly
those with chronic illness. 47
Second, these coordinated care developments add a great deal to the
coherence and potential efficacy of the primary care delivery system.48
However, little in the literature on these programs suggests that they will, or
are intended to, go beyond the delivery of medical care toward the integration
of non-medical social services, such as housing, vocational, and educational
services. It is these broader programs that break the boundaries of traditional
health care delivery that raise concerns of mission creep and the
pathologizing of Medicaid beneficiaries. The next Part examines these
broader programs.
III. BEYOND MEDICAL CARE: SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH

What if coordination of medical care is not enough to achieve integrated
health care - that is, what if there were reason to widen the lens through
which we regard "health care" and "health insurance"? As this section
describes, medical and public health research illustrates that there are many
explanatory factors of a person's health status. 4 9 The delivery of medical
care can be extremely important at times in any person's life. Attention to
factors other than the medical interventions can have a greater effect on
individual and population health than improvements in health care delivery. 0
"Upstream" factors - circumstances in the lives of patients before they

46. MATHEMATICA POL RESEARCH, COORDINATING CARE FOR ADULTS WITH COMPLEX CARE
NEEDS IN THE PATIENT-CENTERED MEDICAL HOME: CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS 1 (2012).

47. See Brigham R. Frandsen et al., Care Fragmentation, Quality, and Costs Among
ChronicallyIll Patients, 21 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 355 (2015) (illustrating that patients with

fragmentation of care had a higher chance of having a departure from clinical best practice,
higher rates of preventable hospitalizations, and higher health care spending).
48. See INST. OF MED. (US) COMMITTEE ON ASSURING THE HEALTH OF THE PUB. IN THE 21ST
CENTURY, THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2002) (explaining

that "since the collapse of health care reform efforts in the early 1990s, the health care
delivery system often does not interact effectively with the other components of the public
health system. . .").
49. See David A. Asch & Kevin G. Volpp, What Business Are We In? The Emergence of
Health As The Business OfHealth Care, 367 NEw ENG. J. MED. 888, 888 (2012) (detailing

bodies of research that show multiple explanatory factors).
50. Paula Braveman & Laura Gottlieb, The Social Determinants ofHealth: It's Time to
Consider the Causes ofthe Causes, 129 PUB. HEALTH REP. 19, 20 (2014) (explaining that the

impacts of socioeconomic and other social factors have an overwhelming impact on health
outcomes).
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manifest illness or injury - can immensely affect their health status. 5 1
Commentators on health finance structures have noted that "[a]n enormous
body of literature supports the view that differences in health are determined
as much by the social circumstances that underlie them as by the biologic
processes that mediate them." 52 These social circumstances include housing
quality, employment and vocational opportunities, stresses related to social
and racial inequality, the availability of healthy fresh food, and opportunities
for recreation and exercise.53
Health commentators recognize that effective health care and health
payment practices must broaden their scope to contemplate services beyond
traditional health care by including social determinants of health. 4 David
Blumenthal and Melinda Abrams of the Commonwealth Fund have
described these developments in the following terms:
Many HNHC [that is, high-need, high cost] patients have nonmedical
needs that compromise their care and increase its costs. Attending to these
needs is a core component of care for HNHC patients. The evidence
suggests that meeting the housing, nutritional, and personal care needs of
HNHC individuals can improve their health and reduce their health care
expenses.. . . Achieving the care efficiencies and effectiveness necessary
will require flexibility to use evidence-based nonmedical services within
VBP [that is, value-based payment] arrangements in which clinicians and
health care organizations are accountable for the total costs of care.55
Other researchers observing similar effects of the social determinants
advanced by Blumenthal and Abrams have noted that increased attention to
"upstream" effects of poor health offers the promise of increased health
equity, in addition to the effects on individual health status and system
equity. 5 6 These researchers suggest that attention to upstream causes of poor
51. Nazleen Bharmal et al., Working Paper: Understandingthe Upstream Social

Determinants ofHealth (2015) (defining "upstream" factors to include "social disadvantage,
risk exposure, and social inequalities that play a fundamental causal role in poor health
outcomes").
52. Asch & Volpp, supra note 49 at 888.
53. See Clare Bambra et al., Tackling the Wider Social Determinants ofHealth andHealth
Equalities: Evidence from Systematic Reviews, 64 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY HEALTH

284, 284 (2010) (explaining that housing quality, access to health care, and quality of work
are social determinants of health); see also Missionfor the Poor, supra note 27, at 187

(noting that social determinants of health also include housing, nutrition, and employment
training services).
54.

LAUREN A. TAYLOR ET AL., LEVERAGING THE SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH:

WHAT WoRKs? 3 (2015) (indicating that greater attention to social determinants of health
may both improve Americans' health and reduce health care costs).
55. David Blumenthal & Melinda K. Abrams, TailoringComplex CareManagementfor
High-Need, High-CostPatients, 316 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 1657, 1657 (2016).
56. Nancy E. Adler et al., Addressing Social Determinants ofHealth and Health
Inequalities, 316 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 1641, 1641 (2016).
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health helps to address some of the causes of health inequities, including
disparate effects of race, sex, social status, and educational achievement.5 1
Moreover, Blumenthal and Abrams point out that APMs can redirect the
attention of caregivers from narrow immediate issues to the, sometimes more
fruitful, source of illness and poor health: upstream social determinants.
The use of the term "APM" presupposes a continuum of relationships
between payor and clinician that range from "traditional" through degrees of
"alternative."59 One useful taxonomy suggests four stages of the payorclinical relationship as medicated through the payment arrangement: fee-forservice with no quality component, fee-for-service with a payment
component linked to quality or value, model "built on fee-for-service
architecture" but with extensive value/quality evaluations and payment
adjustments, and population-based payment in which payment is premised
on addressing social and medical causes of illness. 6 0 Progression through
this continuum of payment models results in effects on the delivery system
of these incentives by which care providers are "increasingly accountable for
both quality and total cost of care" and their attention is more focused "on
population health management as opposed to payment for specific
services."61

The medical care management programs described above in Part I draw
on the benefits of APMs built on a fee-for-service base.62 The necessary next
step in care delivery and Medicaid financing for beneficiaries with complex
medical conditions is programs premised on population-based payment
and/or focused on addressing the social determinants of health.63 At this
point, it should be emphasized that the dichotomy between "medical"
integration (the subject of Part I) and broader integration between medical
and social service systems should not be overstated. One of the federal
models for chronic care management, Medicaid Health Home,64 as
57. Id.
58. See Blumenthal & Abrams, supra note 55, at 1658.
59.

See HEALTH CARE PAYMENT LEARNING & ACTION NETWORK, ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT

MODEL APM FRAMEWORK, MITRE CORP. (2017).
60. Rahul Rajkumar et al., CMS Engaging Multiple Payersin PaymentReform, 311 J.
AM. MED. Ass'N 1967, 1967 (2014).
61. Id.
62. See Blumenthal & Abrams, supra note 55, at 1658; Matthew Fiedler et al., Congress
Should Replace Medicare's Merit-BasedIncentive Payment System, HEALTH AFF. (Feb. 26,
2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180222.35120/full/.
63. See The State Innovation Models (SIM) Program:A Look at Round 2 Grantees, HENRY
J KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Sept. 25, 2015), http://files.kff.org/attachment/fact-sheet-the-state-

innovation-models-sim-program-a-look-at-round-2-grantees (discussing states that have
taken the initiative to address social determinants of health in Medicare and Medicaid
patients).
64. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396w-4 (2018). This section
of the ACA is addressed further infra at Part IV.
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authorized by the ACA, 65 includes a requirement for these Health Homes to
provide "referral to community and social support services, if relevant."O
Whatever the model employed, attention to referral or provision of social
services to address the effects of social determinants of health can improve
health outcomes for complex patients.6 7
Some forms of care delivery already go beyond adding social service
referrals to primary care models.6 8 Compensation models that include
quality and outcomes measures as triggers for enhanced payment can
incentivize clinicians to create referral relationships to community social
service agencies to improve outcomes measured for compensation
purposes. 69 For example, if a bundled or episodic payment system requires
the primary care provider's reporting of patient outcomes and satisfaction,
perhaps with a payment bonus depending on the results, the provider may be
incentivized to connect patients to appropriate community social services
providers.70 In this instance, social services are not directly funded by health
insurance.
Instead, the payment model provides incentives for offering
connections to social services in order to maximize caregivers' income.7 2
Compensation models that "nudge" providers to shift to value-based or
coordinated care models are supported in the literature as mechanisms for
improving quality and containing cost but have met with resistance from

65. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2703, 124 Stat.
119, 319 (2010); Home Information Resource Center, MEDICAID.GOV,
https://www.medicaid.gov/state-resource-center/medicaid-state-technical-assistance/healthhome-information-resource-center/index.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2019)..
66. 42 U.S.C. § 1396w-4(h)(4)(B)(v) (2018).
67. See generally Samantha Artiga & Elizabeth Hinton, Beyond Health Care: The Role of
Social Determinants in
PromotingHealth andHealth Equity, HENRY JKAISER FAM. FOUND. (May 10 2018),

http://files.kff.org/attachment/issue-brief-beyond-health-care; Gayle Shier et al., Strong
Social Support Services, Such As TransportationAnd Help For Caregivers, Can Lead To
Lower Health Care Use And Costs, 32 HEALTH AFF. 544, 548 (2013).

68. See Rajkumar, supra note 60, at 1967 (discussing alternative payment models that go
beyond simple fee for service).
69. Rajkumar et al., supra note 60, at 1968.
70.

CMS' Value-Based Programs, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,

https://www.cms.gov/medicare/quality-initiatives-patient-assessment-instruments/valuebased-programs/value-based-programs.html (last modified July 25, 2018).
71. See Bundled Paymentsfor CareImprovement (BPCI) Initiative: GeneralInformation,
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/bundled-

payments/ (last updated Mar. 7, 2019).
72. See generallyDeborah Bachrach, Addressing Patients'Social Needs: An Emerging
Business Casefor ProviderInvestment, COMMONWEALTH FUND (May 29, 2014),
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/fund-reports/2014/may/addressingpatients-social-needs-emerging-business-case-provider (discussing different payment models
that include economic incentives to providers in order to incorporate social interventions into
care).
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physicians.73
Resistance springs from concerns about reductions in
physician autonomy, concerns about administrative complexity and patient
privacy, and beliefs that the motive - hidden or otherwise - in the models is
to encourage the consolidation of physician practices. 4 These objections can
complicate the adoption of value-based payment models, particularly when
added to concerns for "mission creep" and "medicalization" of health care,
as is more fully described in Part IV below.7 5
Other models go beyond incentivizing providers to consider referrals to
social services in order to provide value or contain costs, and more formally
include mechanisms for joining the provision of medical and social
services.76 For example, states may wish to maximize their federal Medicaid
revenue through initiatives such as Medicaid Health Homes, 77 but maintain
independent funding for social services such as housing and vocational
services. In that case, the state may use "braided funding," which allows
"coordinated multi-agency funding [within state government], but keeps
different funding streams in separate and distinguishable strands, so each can
be tracked at the administrative level."7 " This strategy allows each
contributing agency to track and account for resources. 79 Alternatively, the
state could use "blended funding," which allows states to combine money
from different state accounts, thereby easing administrative burdens but
reducing specific-agency accountability.so
These models are specific forms of Health in All Polices (HiAP)
programs, which comprise more or less coordinated, combined decision-

73. See Laura Panattoni, et al., Nudging Physicians and Patients With Autopend Clinical
Decision Support to Improve DiabetesManagement, 24 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 479 (2018)

(describing physician incentives to coordinate care by reference to behavioral economics
principle of "nudging"); see Sam Nussbaum et al., Principlesfor a Frameworkfor
Alternative Payment Models, 319 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 653, 653-54 (2018); Porter & Kaplan,
supra note 17.
74. See Sheri Porter, ProposedMA4CRA Implementation Rule Misses the Mark, AAFP Tells
CMS, 14 ANNALS FAM. MED. 483 (2016) (in the context of incentives under the Medicare
Access and SHIP Reauthorization Act); Kristin S. Held, New Medicare PaymentRule: a
Trojan Horsefor Government Takeover, 21 J. AM. PHYSICIANS & SURGEONS 87 (2016);
Margaret Amatayakul, Carrotsand Sticks for EHR Implementation, HEALTH CARE
FINANCING MGMT. 60 (2010) (in the context of Meaningful Use incentives under the

American Recovery and Reinvestment Act).
75. See infra Part IV.
76. See Maria Crawford & Rob Houston, State Payment and FinancingModels to Promote
Health and Social Service Integration, CTR. FOR HEALTH CARE STRATEGIES (Feb. 2015),

https://www.chcs.org/media/Medicaid -Soc-Service-Financing_022515_2_Final.pdf
(discussing two types of funding: braided funding and blended funding).
77. See Bachrach et al., supra note 72 (discussing that Medicaid health home certifications
trigger higher levels of reimbursement).
78.
79.
80.

Crawford & Houston, supra note 76.
Crawford & Houston, supra note 76.
Crawford & Houston, supra note 76.
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making by state or local governments to facilitate public health
improvements."' The agencies involved in HiAP programming may include
those that have long overseen those services vital to addressing determinants
of health, including housing, environmental services, and food/nutrition
services.82 The benefit of HiAPs is the reinforcement among several
government agencies (and those entities they regulate and/or fund) of the
shared interest in enhancing the ability of separate programs to combine for
the public's health benefit.8 3
Conversely, the Accountable Communities for Health (ACH) model is
premised on coordination but not unified control of population health-related
spending. 4 ACHs gather public and private entities that share the goal of
improving community health through coordination of services and the
alignment of strategies. 5 The "two-pronged approach" of these
collaborations is to "focus on improving health care for individuals with
existing medical conditions.

.

. and .

.

. facilitate policy and environmental

changes that benefit the entire community."86 The entities forming an ACH,
while sharing goals and strategies, do not share business management or
funding.

Comparatively, Medicaid Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) add a
feature to the above collaborative methods of addressing the effects of social
determinants of health." These organizations, which share the goals of
HiAPs and ACHs, add structural features that squarely raise the issue of
Medicaid mission creep: they have unitary control over strategic decisionmaking, coupled with incentives to expand institutional services beyond
medical care and into the realm of social services. 89
In contrast to Medicaid ACOs, Medicare ACOs are authorized by the
81. Jason Coburn et al., Health in All Urban Policy: City Services Through the Prism of
Health, 91 J. URBAN HEALTH 623, 624-25 (2014).
82. See Multiple Medicaid Missions, supra note 28 at 101-03; Lawrence 0. Gostin,
RestoringHealth to Health Reform: IntegratingMedicine and Public Health to Advance the
Population'sWell-Being, 159 U. PENN. L. REV. 1777, 1819-20 (2011).
83. Coburn, supra note 81.
84. Felicia Heider et al., State Levers to Advance Accountable Communitiesfor Health,
NAT'L ACAD. FOR ST. HEALTH POL'Y 1 (May 24, 2016), https://nashp.org/wp-

content/uploads/2016/05/ACH-Brief-with-Appendix.pdf.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.; See Shana F. Sandberg et al., Hennepin Health: A Safety-Net Accountable Care
Organizationfor The ExpandedMedicaidPopulation, 33 HEALTH AFF. 1975, 1976-77

(2014) (providing an example of an Accountable Care Organization in partnership with a
county human services and public health agency, a public hospital, and a federally qualified
health center created an AHC).
88. Vera Gruessner, Accountable Care OrganizationsExpand Use of Social Services,
HEALTH PAYER INTELLIGENCE (Oct. 28, 2016),
http://www.skainfo.com/images/uploads/misc/ACOFactSheet.pdf [hereinafter SK&A].
89. Multiple MedicaidMissions, supra note 28, at 107; SK&A, supra note 88.
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ACA. 90 These organizations were to incorporate the patient-centered care
aspects of coordinated primary care, but also extend the care coordination
principles to other providers, including hospitals and ancillary care
providers.91 The guiding strategy of creating ACOs within Medicare was to
provide an incentive for a collaborative organization in order to combat
fragmented care by embracing clinical integration of care, while providing
incentives to control costs yet increase value. 92 The incentives flow primarily
from the gainsharing features of the ACA's treatment of Medicare ACOs, 93
by which if an ACO's patients experience less Medicare utilization than
projected, while the ACO maintains quality standards, the ACO receives a
portion of the savings realized by the Medicare program. 9 4
There is no cognate provision in the ACA for Medicaid ACOs. 95
However, states are creating variations of ACOs for application to their
Medicaid populations.96 Some Medicaid ACO models use gainsharing
mechanisms to create incentives for improved care and lower costs. 97 The
combination of several factors - the realization of payments on reducing
costs while maintaining quality, the vulnerability of Medicaid beneficiaries
to the effects of social determinants of health, and the multifaceted
organizational structure of some Medicaid ACOs - can result in these
organizations going beyond medical care to provide, directly or through
partners, social services, too. 98 This combination of these factors can, as
Professor Mantel observed, "improve patient health [and thereby increase
gainsharing income] by investing in social services and other nonclinical
interventions... For example, a Medicaid ACO can improve health outcomes
and lower the medical costs of treating its homeless patients by helping them
obtain stable housing." 99
Accordingly, the financing mechanism of some Medicaid ACOs
incentivizes them to approach patients with the goal of determining what

90. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2010).
9 1. Id.
92. See Mark McClellan et al., A NationalStrategy to PutAccountable Care into Practice,
29 HEALTH AFF. 982, 985 (2010); see also John V. Jacobi, Medicaid Evolutionfor the 21
Century, 102 KY. L.J. 357, 374-75 (2014) [hereinafterMedicaid Evolution].
93. 42 U.S.C. § 1395JJJ (2018) (describing Medicare Shared Savings program).
94. See Nicholas Hodges, Accountable Care Organizations:Realigning the Incentive
Problems in the U.S. HealthcareSystem, 26U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 99, 119-121 (2015).
95. See MedicaidEvolution, supra note 92, at 375.
96. See Jessica Mantel, Tackling the Social DeterminantsofHealth: The CentralRole for
Providers, 33 GA. ST. U.L. REv. 217, 240-42 (2017); see also S. Lawrence Kocot et al.,
Early Experiences with Accountable Care in Medicaid. Special Challenges, Big
Opportunities, 16 POPULATION HEALTH MGMT. S-4, S-4 (2013).
97. Mantel, supra note 96, at 239-40.
98. See Kocot et al., supra note 96, at S-6.
99. Mantel, supra note 96, at 241.
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interventions, medical or otherwise, will reduce the patient's need for health
care. oo If coordinated medical care is the answer, the ACO's response is in
line with the incentives created by patient-centered medical homes.
However, if access to social services is the best way to reduce the patient's
need for expensive medical services, the ACO has incentives to go beyond
medical care:
The financing structure that rewards Medicaid ACOs for reaching and
treating people with chronic medical conditions can also reward [them] for
reaching beyond medical care to the provision of social services to
ameliorate the effects of the social determinants of health. By expanding
the scope of their vision and their activities to include the social
determinants of health, Medicaid ACOs can be transfonative in their
communities. 101
Financial incentives in states' Medicaid programs have fueled an
evolution of patient-centered care to improve quality and reduce the cost of
care.1 02 When limited to coordination of medical care, particularly in the
context of primary care, the results seem to keep health care and finance in
their familiar roles. However, when these financial incentives encourage and
empower Medicaid ACOs and their sister organizations to broaden their
missions in order to include social as well as medical services, 2 the
organizations and the Medicaid agencies that empower them will face
objections on legal and philosophical grounds. Part IV now addresses those
issues.
IV. MEDICAID'S LEGAL AND SOCIAL AUTHORITY TO EXPAND TO ADDRESS
SOCIAL DETERMINANTS
Medicaid is a unique insurance program. From its inception, Medicaid
combined aspects of traditional medical insurance with a social mission
defined by the vulnerable population it was created to serve.104 As Professor
Watson has described this history,

&

100. Mantel, supra note 96, at 261.
101. Multiple MedicaidMissions, supra note 28, at 107.
102. Mantel, supra note 96, at 252 (discussing the patient-centered medical home model that
allows individualized approaches to patients' social needs).
103. See Multiple Medicaid Missions, supra note 28, at 107-08 (stating that some
organizations providing broad population-based services for Medicaid beneficiaries are
called "TACOs," for "Total Accountable Care Organizations"); see Laura D. Hermer, On
the Expansion of "Welfare" and "Health" Under Medicaid, 9 ST. Louis U.J. HEALTH L.
POL'Y 235, 258-63 (2016) (stating that the relevant organization in Oregon is the "CCOs,"
for "Coordinated Care Organizations").
104. See Earl Dirk Hoffman Jr. et al., Overview of the Medicare andMedicaidPrograms,21
HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 1, 1-2 (2000).
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Medicaid was rooted in the Social Security Act's commitment to provide
public support for the needy so they could live in the community.
Medicaid's purpose was to provide both "medical assistance" and
"rehabilitation and other services to help such families and individuals
attain or retain capability for independence or self-care." Medicaid would
provide government funding for social support services and long-term care
as well as hospital and physician care. It would fund both nursing home
care and community based care. 10 5
The starting point for discerning the general purpose of Medicaid is
usually found in the statutory language describing the conditions under which
states may receive federal matching funds for their programs.1 0 6 The relevant
provision in the Social Security Act allows for appropriations:
For the purpose of enabling each State, as far as practicable under the
conditions in such State, to furnish (1) medical assistance on behalf of
families with dependent children and of aged, blind, or disabled
individuals, whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs
of necessary medical services, and (2) rehabilitation and other services to
help such families and individuals attain or retain capability for
independence or self-care. . ..107
To the extent the services of community organizations extending care to
vulnerable Medicaid recipients take the form of patient-centered medical
homes, the ACA's amendments to the Medicaid statute specifically authorize
the payment of enhanced payments to encourage the ACA's version of
integrated care for beneficiaries with chronic conditions, provided through
Medicaid Health Homes.os Karen Davis has described the purposes of this
provision:

105. Sidney D. Watson, From Almshouses to Nursing Homes and Community Care: Lessons
GA. ST. U.L. REv. 937, 953-54 (2010).
106. See Stewartv. Azar, 313 F.Supp. 3d 237, 260 (D.D.C. 2018) (citing Pharm. Research
Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 75 (1st Cir. 2001)); see also Jonathan R. Bolton,
The Case ofthe DisappearingStatute: A Legal & Policy Critique of the Use ofSection 1115
Waivers to Restructure the Medicaid Program,37 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 91, 132, n.235
&

from Mledicaid's History, 26

(2003) (providing the proposition that 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1 is the touchstone for the core
purpose of the Medicaid program).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1 (1984).
108. 42 U.S.C. § 1396w-4(c)(1) (2018) (providing that "[p]ayments made to a designated
provider, a team of health care professionals operating with such a provider, or a health team
for such services shall be treated as medical assistance for purposes of' operating a Medicaid
Health Home); 42 U.S.C. § 1396w-4(c)(2)(B) (2018) (providing that states may reimburse
Medicaid Health Homes using alternative payment models); 42 U.S.C. § 1396w-4(a) (2018)
(providing that states must file a state plan amendment to initiate Medicaid Health Home
services); see Section 2703, the Medicaid Health Home Provision of the Affordable Care
Act, CATALYST CTR. (June 2014), https://cahpp.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/04/2703healthhome.pdf.
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The Affordable Care Act encourages the widespread adoption of PCMHs
by offering states the option to increase reimbursement to primary care
sites designated as "health homes" for Medicaid patients with chronic
conditions. Health homes are similar to medical homes, but tend to
emphasize the integration with public health. . .. Under the law, teams of
primary care providers (including physicians, nurse practitioners, and
physician assistants) will agree to provide comprehensive care
management, care coordination and health promotion, transitional care
between hospital and primary care, referral to community and social
services, patient and family engagement and use of information
technology to link services. The . . . provision gives states flexibility to
design payment methodology that works for them, and allows for state
variation in the payment approach that they choose. 109
The analysis is thus far uncontroversial; payment for primary care for
people with chronic illnesses is specifically permitted by the Medicaid statute
and states can use APMs to encourage the providers of primary care to
coordinate care to increase quality and reduce cost." 0 What of the more
expansive care and payment models that sweep in social as well as medical
services?
Notably, while states may fund services that support housing for
beneficiaries, they may not use federally-matched funds to directly pay for
room and board or otherwise pay directly for housing costs."' The United
States Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) has suggested that
it may revisit this issue, and may even be open to permitting federal funding
of state programs.112
DHHS Secretary Alex Azar recently suggested that, in line with the
"whole person" direction in modem health care and finance, states may be
given leave to use Medicaid funding for housing, healthy food, and other

109. Karen Davis et al., How the Affordable CareAct Will Strengthen the Nation's Primary
CareFoundation, 26 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1201, 1202 (2011).
110. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396w-4(c)(2)(B) (2018) (authorizing federal matching payments to
state using alternative payment methods in Medicaid Health Homes).
111. See 42 C.F.R. § 441.3 10(a)(2) (2000) (providing that federally-matched Medicaid
funding for room and board are prohibited in home and community-based waiver programs);
see also Vikki Wachino, CICS InformationalBulletin, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS. (June 26, 2015), https://www.medicaid.gov/federal-policy-guidance/downloads/cib06-26-2015.pdf (describing availability of federally-matched Medicaid funds to provide
wrap-around services for housing, but not room and board or other direct housing costs);
Julia Paradise & Donna Cohen Ross, Linking Medicaid andSupportive Housing:
Opportunitiesand On-the-GroundExamples, HENRY J KAISER FAM. FouND. (Jan. 27, 2017),
http://files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-Brief-Linking-Medicaid-and-Supportive-HousingOpportunities-and-On-the-Ground-Examples.
112. See Wachino, supra note 111, at 1.
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goods and services related to social determinants of health." 3 He elaborated:
What if we gave organizations more flexibility so they could pay a
beneficiary's rent if they were in unstable housing, or make sure that a
diabetic had access to, and could afford, nutritious food? . . If that sounds
like an exciting idea ... I want you to stay tuned to what CMMI [Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation] is up to."'
While sound arguments support Azar's suggestion," 5 as discussed above,
current regulations prohibit the use of federally-matched Medicaid funds to
pay for rent or other direct housing costs. 116 Social supports, such as housing
costs, are acknowledged to be important health-related expenditures, but
federally-matched Medicaid funding is unavailable for that purpose, and
accordingly, organizations such as Medicaid ACOs are vitally important.
Simply stated, Medicaid ACOs have the capacity to convert Medicaid funds
to private ownership."1 7 That is, once the ACO receives gainsharing
payments from a state's Medicaid agency, those funds belong to the ACO,
and the ACO may direct those funds to any use within the ACO's corporate
mission."" Just as a private physician may contribute the proceeds of his or
her Medicaid reimbursement check to a homeless person to help pay his or
her rent, so too may a Medicaid ACO use its excess funds received from
Medicaid to pay for housing supports."l 9 If the ACO's management
113. Paul Barr & Virgil Dickson, CMS may allow hospitals to pay for housing through

Medicaid, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Nov. 14, 2018),

&

https://www.modernhealthcare.conarticle/20181114/NEWS/I 81119981.
114. Id
115. See Mary Crossley, Bundling Justice: Medicaid's Supportfor Housing, 46 J.L., MED.
ETHics 595, 597-98 (2018) (explaining that Medicaid is prohibited from directly funding

housing costs and that those on Medicaid must rely on other state and local programs to help
them find affordable housing); Kathy Moses,et al., Supportive Housingfor Chronically
Homeless MedicaidEnrollees: State Strategies, CTR. FOR HEALTH CARE STRATEGIES (Jan.

2016), www.chcs.org/resource/supportive-housing-for-chronically-homeless-medicaidenrollees-state-strategies/ (arguing that given the linkage between housing instability and
health care utilization and costs, policymakers should focus on expanding access to
permanent supportive housing and addressing the health care needs of chronically homeless
individuals).
116. 42 C.F.R. § 441.3 10(a)(2) (2000).
117. See Hodges, supra note 94, at 112 (stating that CMS makes direct payments to ACOs

under the original Medicare Parts A and B fee-for-service program); but see, Rachael
Matulis & Jim Lloyd, The History, Evolution, and Future ofMedicaidAccountable Care
Organizations, CTR. FOR HEALTH CARE STRATEGIES (Feb. 2018),

https://www.chcs.org/media/ACO-Policy-Paper 022718.pdf (stating that many state ACOs
have leveraged federal funds for delivery and payment reform initiatives).
118. See Multiple Medicaid Missions, supra note 28, at 106 (stating that ACOs have

substantial discretion in how they use their gainsharing payments).
119. See generallyDiana Crumley & Marlise Pierre-Wright, Addressing Social
Determinants ofHealth throughMedicaid Accountable Care Organizations, CTR. FOR
HEALTH CARE STRATEGIES (Apr. 18, 2018), www.chcs.org/addressing-social-determinants-
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concludes, as Azar suggests it should,1 2 0 that paying for housing or other
social service costs with funds comprising its operating margin will improve
the health status of its patients and lower overall health costs, it would not
only be permissible, but prudent, for the ACO management to do so.
The conversion of Medicaid funds to private funds is not mysterious. The
ACO receives funds for services rendered, and can use them for its own
purposes just as any Medicaid contractor may use its receipts from Medicaid
for its own purposes.121 The noteworthy feature of ACOs' ability to so use
its funds is that the steps outlined above permit state Medicaid agencies to
lawfully circumvent the limitations on Medicaid spending through their
contracts with Medicaid ACOs.1 2 2 States are authorized to contract for these
services through the mechanism of Section 1115 waivers.1 2 3
Section 1115 waivers allow the Secretary to waive some general federal
requirements to permit states to use federally-matched funds if he finds that
the state proposal is likely to assist in "promot[ing] the objectives" of
Medicaid.1 24 Under Section 1115 authority, the "Secretary can waive almost
any Medicaid state plan requirement" and "can also permit federal financial
participation for costs not otherwise matchable." 25 These waivers have
become increasingly important as states strive to particularize their Medicaid
programs to suit their own perceptions of programmatic need.1 26
States have used the Section 1115 waiver process to obtain federal
approval of the use of federally-matched Medicaid funds to support
organizations such as Medicaid ACOs, which seek to widen the lens of health
care delivery to integrate medical care and social services.1 27 The models
health-medicaid-accountable-care-organizations/ (providing an overview of state approaches
to addressing social determinants of health such as homelessness).
120. Barr& Dickson, supra note 113.
121. Multiple MedicaidMissions, supra note 28, at 105-06.
122. See generallyMultiple MedicaidMissions, supra note 28, at 107-08 (stating that
Medicaid payments to ACOs gives them the flexibility to use their resources to address the
particular cost-drivers of poor populations without creating a separate targeted form of
Medicaid).
123. Matulis & Lloyd, supra note 117, at 4.
124. About Section 1115 Demonstrations,MEDICAID.GOV,
www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/section-1 115-demo/about-i 115/index.html (last visited Apr. 1,
2019); Judith Solomon & Jessica Schubel, Medicaid Waivers Should FurtherProgram
Objectives, Not Impose Barriersto Coverage and Care, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y
PRIORITIES (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/8-2817health.pdf.
125. Waivers, MEDICAID & CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMMISSION,
www.macpac.gov/subtopic/waivers/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2019).
126. See Abbe R. Gluck & Nicole Huberfeld, What is Federalism in HealthcareFor?, 70
STAN. L. REv. 1689, 1729-30 (2018) (noting that 1115 waivers have always been a tool to
allow states to deviate from Medicaid requirements); see Hermer, supra note 103, at 237
(providing a description of 1115 waivers and their purpose).
127. See Hermer, supra note 103, at 258-63 (providing an example of how Oregon used
federal funds for social supports); see Kocot et al., supra note 96, at S-6 - S-9 (describing
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differ greatly one from the other; 128 the theory of the benefit of combining
medical and social services is sound, but evaluation of these disparate
programs will tell whether the programs successfully improve quality while
containing care, and which models present the most promise.1 2 9
Some integration of social and medical services in Medicaid comes from
a different source. Increasingly, Medicaid managed care organizations
(MCOs) are committed to evaluating the care needs of complex patients, and
to providing the complex care these patients require.1 3 0 As Medicaid MCOs
address their most vulnerable members, they uncover social circumstances,
such as housing insecurity, that exacerbate underlying medical needs. 131 As
Medicaid ACOs mature, they present opportunities for partnership, and
competition, with MCOs.1 3 2 In this model, Medicaid ACOs contract with
MCOs to provide services to identified members, with terms and conditions
of the contract mutually agreeable to the parties. 133 Such contractual
arrangements between two private parties does not require federal approval,
and thereby further permits Medicaid ACOs' integrated model of care to find
financial footing within the regulatory landscape.134
Furthermore, amendments to regulations governing requirements for
states' contracts with MCOs strengthened the potential for partnerships
between Medicaid MCOs and Medicaid ACOs. 135 These amendments

state plans from Arkansas, Illinois, Oregon, Minnesota, New Jersey, Iowa, and Vermont,
among others, and how they have implemented Medicaid ACOs); see also Jim Lloyd et al.,
MedicaidAccountableCare OrganizationPrograms:State Profiles, CTR. FOR HEALTH CARE
STRATEGIES (Oct. 2015), www.chcs.org/media/Medicaid-Accountable-Care-OrganizationPrograms-State-Profiles-I 115.pdf (gathering state examples of structuring Medicaid ACOs).
128. See generallyLloyd et al., supra note 127 (providing an overview of programs in
Colorado, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, New Jersey, Oregon, Utah, and Vermont).
129. See Matulis & Lloyd, supra note 117, at 6 (reporting positive cost and quality results
after evaluations conducted in five states); see generally K. John McConnell, Early
Performance in MedicaidAccountable Care Organizations:A Comparisonof Oregon and
Colorado, 177 J. AM. MED. Ass'N INTERNAL MED. 538, 544-46 (2017) (providing a positive
evaluation of two states' models).
130. See Sara Rosenbaum et al., MedicaidPayment and DeliveryReform: Insightsform
Managed CarePlan Leaders in MedicaidExpansion States, COMMONWEALTH FuND 1, 2
(Mar. 7, 2018),
mediafiles-publicati
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/sites/default/files/documents/
ons issue brief 2018 mar rosenbaum insights from medicaidplanleadersib.pdf
(describing how MCOs cover and furnish care across a spectrum of health needs and may
even specialize in certain services).
131. Id. at 2-3.
132. Matulis & Lloyd, supra note 117, at 5.
133. Matulis & Lloyd, supra note 117, at 3.
134. Matulis & Lloyd, supra note 117, at 3.
135. See e.g. 82 Fed. Reg. 180 (Jan. 3, 2017) (recognizing that partnerships could be a
crucial driver of spending and quality); see also 82 Fed. Reg. 5428 (Jan. 18, 2017)
(amending the rule to provide states and managed care plans with adequate time to design
and implement payment systems as they see fit).
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clarified states' abilities to require MCOs to adopt APMs and other incentive
mechanisms to encourage integrated care.1 3 6 States may "require [a
participating MCO] to implement value-based purchasing models for
provider reimbursement, such as pay for performance arrangements, bundled
payments, or other service payment models intended to recognize value or
outcomes over volume of services." 3 7 Under these regulations,
States may encourage or require specific APMs, including models that
drive investments in practices that connect health with nonmedical factors,
such as routine screening for domestic abuse, environmental hazards in the
home, food security, housing stability, and other potential red flags.
Asking such nonclinical questions can identify substantial health risks that
a standard clinical evaluation might miss.138
States may also condition payment to the plan on its meeting certain
requirements related to social determinants of health: 139
Under another provision, states can create payment incentives for the
health plans, including potentially establishing performance metrics
related to social and structural determinants of health. For example, a
state could withhold part of a health plan's capitation rate unless it exceeds
a state-set goal for reducing maternal mortality or improving lead
screening for young children.140
Therefore, states have several avenues to add integrated care to their
Medicaid programs.i1' They may add integrated primary care through
Medicaid Health Homes.1 4 2 They may also add broader integration of social
and medical care via ACOs, or similar organizations, either through Section
1115 waivers or through conditioning Medicaid managed care contracts on
the plans' utilization of community-based, integrated care programs.143
These mechanisms are available under current law, and can quickly alter state
Medicaid programs for the better.
V.

THE DANGERS OF EMPOWERING BROAD INTEGRATED CARE

136. See generally 42 C.F.R. § 438.6 (2017) (outlining requirements for state MCO payment

models).
137. 42 C.F.R. § 438.6(c)(1)(i) (2017).
138. DAVID MACHLEDT, ADDRESSING THE SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH THROUGH
MEDICAID MANAGED CARE 1, 3 (Nov. 2017).

139. Id. at 2; 42 C.F.R. § 438.6(b) (2017).
140. MACHLEDT, supra note 138, at 3.
141. See e.g., MACHLEDT, supra note 138 (discussing how revised regulations for Medicaid

managed care plans encourages states to improve care coordination, adopt alternative
payment models, and provide long-term services and supports in the home and community).
142. See MedicaidEvolution, supra note 92, at 373-74 (examining proposals for adapting

Medicaid to the needs of twenty- first century health care by utilizing health homes).
143. MedicaidEvolution, supra note 92, at 374.
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ORGANIZATIONS

This article candidly advocates for health care delivery and finance
innovations that address root causes of ill health for poor and vulnerable
people with complex medical needs.' 44 The innovative methods described in
this article are calculated to serve those goals, for the reasons stated herein.
There are four sets of objections to the adoption of those methods discussed
in this part: potential risk to community-based social service agencies, the
risk that the "medicalization" of poverty will stigmatize the poor by virtue of
the expansion of health care to include social determinants of health, the risk
that the reforms described in this article will either undermine Medicaid's
broader mission through "mission creep" into non-health areas, and the risk
that addressing broad social needs through a health care lens will undermine
broader anti-poverty efforts. These are serious concerns, but this format
allows only very brief responses to each.
A. The suggested reforms supportsocial services
The development of Medicaid ACOs is unlikely to degrade support for
community-based social services.145 To the contrary, their development
promises to increase support for these service providers.1 46 Medicaid ACOs
and other health entities engaged in addressing the effects of social
determinants of heath will need access to providers of social goods such as
housing, employment/vocational, and healthy foods and nutritional
services.0 These entities will face build or buy choices when developing
capacity for social services, 4 s but it is likely that partnerships with, rather

144. See Mission for the Poor, supra note 27, at 187 (discussing that as the Centers for

Medicare and Medicaid Services agency turns to the regulation of Medicaid managed care
programs, it should leave states sufficient flexibility to encourage innovative programs for
the poor); see also Multiple Medicaid Missions, supra note 28, at 105 (discussing social

determinants of health and suggests the benefits of Medicaid adopting ACO methods to best
serve the poor); see also Medicaid Evolution, supra note 92 (examining proposals for

adapting Medicaid to the needs of twenty- first century health care in order to serve the poor
and vulnerable Americans for whom Medicaid is intended).
145. See, e.g., Multiple Medicaid Missions, supra note 28, at 107 (describing the importance

of "totally accountable care organizations" in the community).
146. See Multiple Medicaid Missions, supra note 28, at 106-08 (discussing that Medicaid

ACOs can reach out to the chronically ill as well as ameliorate the effects of the social
determinants of health).
147. See Multiple Medicaid Missions, supra note 28, at 106-08 (explaining that ACOs can

target social determinants of health and can pursue a lot of which impacts health outcomes
outside of the health care system such as good housing, healthy foods, and in-jail diversion
programs).
148. See Taz Hussein & Mariah Collins, The Community Cure for Health Care, STAN. Soc.
INNOVATION REV. (July 21, 2016),

https://ssir.org/articles/entry/the_community-cure-for-health
options in health system integration).
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than displacement of, social service providers will be the norm.' 49 Further,
as is described below, associating social services with addressing the social
determinants of health may enhance social support for community services
for which support is currently somewhat abstract and uneven.150
B. Organizedfunding for needed health services, broadly construed, does
not pathologize beneficiaries with complex conditions
There is a risk of stigmatizing or "pathologizing" the Medicaid
beneficiaries, or a broader cohort they may represent, through the
"medicalization" of their conditions that are attributable to social
disadvantages rather than biological pathologies.15 ' This issue is multifaceted. The concern for the "medicalization" of poverty is sometimes cast
as an objection to the treatment of the symptoms - that is, the illnesses
resulting from poverty, rather than the underlying cause, or poverty. 52 But
"medicalization" can also refer to the stigmatizing, or pathologizing, effect
of turning everyday life events into something pathological by describing it
in medical terminology.1 53 Under either definition, medicalization of nonmedical problems can be concerning - but the danger does not seem to be
present in the settings described in this article.
Medicaid beneficiaries participating in integrated care programs are, or
should be due to their medical complexity, deeply connected to the medical
system with or without the overlay of these new payment models. 5 4 Their
very medical complexity, then, assures that their lives are deeply intertwined
with the health care delivery and finance systems. In a sense, then, the
objection to these payment models as "medicalizing" social services have
miss the mark: it is more accurate to say that social service providers, by their
coordination with health care providers, broaden their understanding of the
149. See Sandberg et al., supra note 87, at 1975 (stating that health care payment and
delivery models that challenge providers to be accountable for outcomes have fueled interest
in community-level partnerships).
150. See Sandberg et al., supra note 87, at 1976 (discussing how bringing health care and
social services together targets social determinants that drive poor health and addresses
community needs).
151. See generally Helena Hansen et al., Pathologizing Poverty: New forms ofDiagnosis,
Disability, and Structural Stigma Under Welfare Reform, 103 Soc. SCI. & MED. 76, 76
(2014) (describing the subjective experience of structural stigma imposed by the increasing
medicalization of public support for the poor).
152. See Lois Shepherd & Robin Fretwell Wilson, Introduction: The Medicalization of
Poverty, 46 J.L., MED. & ETHics 563, 563 (2018) (introducing papers from a conference on
the medicalization of poverty).
153. See Joseph E. Davis, How Iedicalization Lost Its Way, 43 Soc'y 51, 51 (2006)
(explaining the evolution of the term "medicalization" in the sociology literature).
154. See generally Long et al., supra note 8, at 29 (explaining that high-need patients are
also more likely to be publicly insured).
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etiology of their clients' needs for the supports such as housing, job training,
and nutritional services. The relationship between social services and
medical care mutually supports both systems' mission, then, as health care
providers incorporate social services as a way to ameliorate the medical
conditions that give rise to the high level of both medical and social need.
C. Alternative payment methods fit squarely within Medicaid's mission
The programs described in this article expand Medicaid's mission, and, to
that extent, can be resisted as furthering "mission creep" for an expensive
and vital program. The attachment of Medicaid funds to care integration
either directly, as in the case of Medicaid Medical Homes,1 5 6 or indirectly by
incentivizing Medicaid MCOs to provide social services,15 1 comprises an
extension of the scope of Medicaid programs. There is a simple explanation:
our understanding of the needs of people with complex medical conditions
has evolved since Medicaid's origin, and appropriate health care has become
more complex. 5 s Attention to the housing needs of vulnerable, medically
complex Medicaid beneficiaries is closer to the heart of the purposes of the
Medicaid program than are, for example, work requirements,1 5 9 restrictive
pharmaceutical formularies,160 or increased beneficiary copayments.161

D. Serving complex beneficiarieswith organized care does not betray the
struggle against inequality andpoverty
The final concern is the most disturbing and the hardest to address. This
155. See Long et al., supra note 8, at 83 (improving care for high- need patients, often
include the integration and delivery of social services in addition to better coordinated
medical care); see generally Blumenthal & Abrams, supra note 12, at 1657 (noting that
improving the care of high-need, high-cost patients should be a high priority for the next
federal administration); see also Mantel, supra note 96, at 272 (noting that some states have
initiated programs that help physician practices transition to the patient- centered medical
home model).
156. See Davis et al., supra note 109 (describing the integrated care functions of primary
care medical homes).
157. See MACHLEDT, supra note 138 (describing regulatory tools available to states to
encourage Medicaid managed care organizations to connect complex patients to social
services).
158. See Long et al., supra note 8, at xiii (explaining that care models and policies must
extend beyond strictly medical approaches to address social and behavioral factors).
159. See generally Crossley, supra note 115, at 599 (discussing how supportive housing
helps decrease unmet health needs and improve health outcomes for homeless persons,
reinforcing housing's importance as a determinant of health).
160. See M. Christopher Roebuck et al., Increased Use OfPrescriptionDrugsReduces
Medical Costs In MedicaidPopulations, 34 HEALTH AFF. 1586, 1586-1587 (2015)
(cautioning that formulary restrictions in Medicaid can result in unintended consequences).
161. See Krutika Amin et al., Effect ofMedicaidPolicy Changes on MedicationAdherence:
Differences by Baseline Adherence, 23 J MANAGED CARE & SPECIALTY PHARMACY 337, 337
(2017) (copayments and increased periodicity of refills for pharmaceuticals can reduce
adherence for some beneficiaries).
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concern suggests that attending to the problems of inadequate housing,
inadequate fresh food, and failing educational institutions through a health
lens will impede broader social efforts to address poverty head-on. It is not
hyperbole to state that poverty in one of the richest countries in the world is
one of America's two original sins.1 62 Efforts to address the problem of
poverty could be diverted if the core problems caused by poverty are thought
of as susceptible of solution by improving the health system. That is, efforts
to take on poverty directly through social and political action might be
weakened by the perception that improvements in health finance and delivery
offer a magic bullet capable of improving the lives of the most vulnerable
without disturbing the underlying division of power and privilege.
That result seems unlikely. Instead, as Dayna Bowen Matthew has
pointed out, the "association between housing affordability and health
outcomes" can be beneficial.1 63 It can encourage investment in a race-neutral
way, and substitute a system with palpable goals for all for the somewhat
more chimerical goals of justice and equity. 64 In addition, the coupling of
health systems analysis with housing and other markers of poverty allows
some ready metrics for describing the human toll of the social determinants
of health in the context of a system that is capable of providing some
organized response.1 6 5 The ultimate verdict on the proper strategy to follow
to end poverty in America is beyond the scope of this article. However, there
seems reason for hope that adopting organized, integrated systems of health
delivery and finance directed to the poor and vulnerable may pull us in the
right direction.
VI. CONCLUSION

The health care delivery and finance systems have not been kind to the
poor and vulnerable. The development of research supporting systems of
care that integrate medical services for those with medically complex
conditions, and even more significantly, integrate medical care and services
directed at addressing social determinants of health provides some reason to
hope. Promising health delivery methods are developing, and payment
systems are similarly advancing.1 66 The law of Medicaid is not in tension
162. See generallyMATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED (2016); JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE
INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1991); see also MICHELLE ALEXANDER,
THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2012)

(indicating that America's other original sin is racism).
163. Dayna Bowen Matthew, Health And Housing: Altruistic Mvedicalization OfAmerica's
Affordability Crisis, 81 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 192 (2018) (arguing in favor of

responding to the lack of affordable housing in America as a public health crisis).
164. Id. at 193-94.
165. Id.
166. See Sandberg et al., supra note 87, at 1975 (stating that health care payment and

delivery models that challenge providers to be accountable for outcomes have fueled interest
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with these reform efforts. In fact, these reform efforts demonstrate a
harmony between good care and sound stewardship of a vital public
program.1 6 7 Models will evolve, and evidence will point the way to
improvement, but the poor and vulnerable have some reason for optimism in
the face of harsh life conditions.

in community-level partnerships); see Missionfor the Poor, supra note 27 at 187 (discussing
that as the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services agency turns to the regulation of
Medicaid managed care programs, it should leave states sufficient flexibility to encourage
innovative programs for the poor).
167. See generallyMedicaidEvolution, supra note 92 (examining proposals for adapting
Medicaid to the needs of twenty- first century health care in order to serve the poor and
vulnerable Americans for whom Medicaid is intended).
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